Background Beliefs, Religious Plurality, and the Parity Thesis by McLeod, Mark S.
Digital Commons @ George Fox University
Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on
Reformed Epistemology College of Christian Studies
1993
Background Beliefs, Religious Plurality, and the
Parity Thesis
Mark S. McLeod
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality
Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of
Religion Commons
This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Christian Studies at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @
George Fox University.
Recommended Citation
McLeod, Mark S., "Background Beliefs, Religious Plurality, and the Parity Thesis" (1993). Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on
Reformed Epistemology. Paper 11.
http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality/11
[ 8 ] 
Background Beliefs, 
Religious Plurality, and the 
Parity Thesis 
The goals of this chapter fall into two groups. The first group 
deals with tying together several loose ends surrounding the role of 
background beliefs in CP or, more generally, in noninferential me­
diated practices. Thus in Section I I answer the question whether 
Alston is better off, epistemically, with CP than Planting a is with 
an exaggerated Alstonian epistemic practice. The second group 
surrounds the issue of why Alston himself finally abandons the 
parity thesis between PP and CP. The goals of the remaining sec­
tions are first to explain Alston's position on how religious diver­
sity affects the rationality of engaging in CP and second to explain 
how his view fits in with the argument of this essay, as far as we 
have reached. 
I . The Resurrected Evidentialist 
My argument in Chapter 7 suggests that Plantinga's defense of 
PT Ph or more specifically PT Ph must appeal to an exaggerated ver­
sion of CP, thus opening the door to an arbitrary generation of 
beliefs or demanding a retreat to natural theology or other discur­
sive bases for theistic belief. I conclude that PT Ph and hence PT Ph 
are not true. Does PTA fare any better? This question cannot be 
answered without some further work. I argued that both CP and 
PP, as Alston construes them, are practices in which there is a 
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lingo-conceptual link between the experience and the belief gener­
ated by that experience: if one believes "I see a tree," then one does 
not fail to affirm, when queried, something like "I am being ap­
peared to treely"; if one sees God's creative work in this flower, 
then one does not fail to affirm, when asked, something like "I am 
being appeared to God-createdly." But I have also argued that CP 
is a noninferential mediated practice whereas PP is a conceptual­
reading practice. The background belief challenge suggests that 
there can be nothing in an experience itself that allows one to de­
scribe the phenomenology of the experience by propositions such 
as "It is of God." This is true for the same reasons that no experi­
ential phenomenon can itself be described as "It is of Tim Tib­
betts." In short, background beliefs are important when it comes 
to the experience of, and corresponding beliefs about, epistemically 
unique and spatiotemporal nonrooted individuals. The time has 
come for a further analysis of this claim, especially as it applies to CP. 
PP does not simply generate, as noted in Chapter 2, beliefs 
about epistemically unique physical objects; that is, it also gener­
ates beliefs about certain kinds of things, it classifies things. It is 
this fact, among others, that allows PP to be a conceptual-reading 
practice. We all seem to share, roughly, the same conceptual 
scheme, or at least we do pragmatically. Once PP is set into mo­
tion by an experience, the belief generated is one in which the 
physical object scheme allows us to read off a physical object be­
lief. But there is a distinction to be made between PP as a classify­
ing practice generating beliefs such as "Those are desks" and 
"These are trees" and the epistemic practice (or subpractice)' that 
allows us to generate beliefs about epistemically unique physical 
individual objects, such as "The desk in my office is brown" and 
"The tree in my front yard needs cutting down." One simple way 
to individuate between these two practices is to recall a point I 
made in discussing Alston's account of perception, namely, that 
with PP one has a set of concepts (e.g., tree, house, car) that can be 
applied in situations that are novel to the perceiver. One can im­
mediately objectify new perceptual experiences into physical object 
concepts, since the concepts are general enough to apply to newly 
experienced objects. This is not the case with epistemically unique 
physical objects such as Suzie's house. One may have the concept 
I. I believe the best choice here is a subpractice; see Chapter I I for details. 
Background Beliefs and Religious Plurality ( I 57 
"house" before seeing the buildings in a neighborhood that is new 
to one's experience and hence be able to identify the buildings as 
houses. But one does not have a complete enough concept of 
Suzie's house before an experience (obtained in person or through 
someone's description of the house-see Chapter 3, Section 4) of 
Suzie's house, since that concept is not a general one applicable to 
many houses but a unique one that applies only to Suzie's house. 
So, one cannot have detailed concepts of Suzie's house before be­
ing "introduced" to the particular house that is Suzie's. And reap­
plication of such concepts relies on having memories, not of other 
houses that are like Suzie's (or at least not solely so) but of this 
particular house and one's earlier experiences of it. In short, the 
concepts we attach to unique objects are attached not by our being 
able to recognize, for example, that this is a house of the Suzie 
kind (as if there were more than one house that is Suzie's) but 
rather by our remembering earlier experiences of this (numerically 
the same) house. This distinction in approach suggests a distinction 
in epistemic practice. As I argued in Chapter 3, in PP the concepts 
that attach to epistemically unique physical objects are made up of 
kind concepts and information about local spatiotemporal location. 
Insofar as this position is right, then the practice, or subpractice, of 
forming beliefs about epistemically unique physical objects is a 
conceptual-reading practice. Let us call this (sub)practice that gen­
erates beliefs about epistemically unique physical objects the 
"unique physical object practice." 
Parallel to the distinction between PP and unique physical object 
practice, we should recognize a distinction between what I call "re­
ligious practice" and CP. Since CP generates beliefs about the 
unique God of the Christian faith, it seems somewhat parallel to 
unique physical object practice and its generation of beliefs about 
epistemically unique individuals. The practice that allows us to 
form beliefs with religious (as opposed to specifically Christian) 
content seems parallel to PP. The content of these religious beliefs 
is a little hard to spell out, but perhaps one could point to phenom­
enological analyses such as Rudolf Otto's mysterium tremendum.2 
Many (dare I say most?) humans have at least a (more or less) 
2. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in 
the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey (I923; 
rpt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, I978), pp. I2-30. 
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vague sense of a reality beyond the merely physical or even the 
merely (humanly) personal. But as the plurality of religions indi­
cates, there are many ways to understand this reality. At the bot­
tom of all these, I suggest, is this awareness of a nonhuman, non­
physical reality. Religious practice puts us into contact with this 
reality. The additional and uniquely Christian beliefs generated do 
not come via religious practice but through CP, a practice that 
allows us to identify the experience as an experience of God the 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, or the First Person of the Trinity, 
that is, as an experience of an epistemically unique individual. It is 
CP, and not religious practice, that clearly is a noninferential medi­
ated practice. 
It is CP, then, as contrasted to religious practice, that requires 
the use of background beliefs. Religious practice does not, for we 
have a conceptual scheme that alone allows us to objectify our ex­
perience into the kinds of vague categories I suggested above. 3 We 
need the background beliefs for the doctrinal content of the Chris­
tian beliefs. Do these background beliefs need justification? Here I 
plan to fulfill my promise of explaining why the ranking of PP 
over CP is an epistemic ranking and not merely one based on the 
cognitive desirability of PP's features over CP's. 
I suggest that the background beliefs required in CP need justi­
fication as much as do those beliefs required for the exaggerated 
CP to which I appealed in discussing Plantinga. I argued in Plan­
tinga's case that the content of the background beliefs is substan­
tively theistic, for there is no necessary lingo-conceptual link be­
tween the experience generating theistic beliefs and the beliefs 
generated. To avoid arbitrariness in belief, then, the evidentialist's 
demands seem to press in on Plantinga's position. It is thus fairly 
3. J. William Forgie's work, from which I drew the background belief chal­
lenge, may be faulty since it does not distinguish clearly enough between religious 
practice and other practices. If "God" picks out only the vague kinds of charac­
teristics that religious practice allows us to, then Forgie's argument needs refining. 
Compare, for example, an epistemic practice that allows me to be justified in be­
lieving that I am in the presence of a human person as opposed to one in which I 
am justified in believing that I am in the presence of Tom Tibbetts. In the former, 
I do not have to identify the person as Tom or Tim, but in the latter I do. But it is 
only in the latter that I need background information in the form of beliefs. There 
is more on this general view in the text, but what is said there applies not only to 
Alston's work but to Forgie's as well. 
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obvious that theistic* beliefs need justification. Although perhaps 
less obvious, so do the background beliefs for CP. Are these sub­
stantively theistic in content? Yes, but not only so. They are sub­
stantively Christian in content. Even though what I have said about 
religious practice allows for some religious content in experiences 
generating religious beliefs, 4 this experiential content itself does not 
allow for the generation of specifically Christian beliefs. The 
source of the Christian content, I suggest, rests entirely in the 
background beliefs-call them "Christian* beliefs." And surely 
these need justification. 
Granting the need for a religious content in the experience gen­
erating Christian beliefs (to allow for the spirit of Alston's direct 
approach), there is still nothing phenomenologically in the experi­
ence that makes it a Christian experience. What would make an 
experience a Christian experience, as opposed to a merely religious 
experience? For that matter, what could make an experience a 
Christian, as opposed to a merely religious, experience? I propose 
that nothing in experience alone can do so. When one holds Chris­
tian* beliefs, one may take the experience (and perhaps legit­
imately so) to be Christian. But taking an experience to be explic­
itly Christian and its actually being so are not at all the same thing. 
Why, then, understand any religious experience to be a Christian 
experience? Why not Buddhist, or Hindu? There is, I suggest, a 
kind of arbitrariness in doing so, a kind of arbitrariness in the use 
of CP. Of course, one does not typically select CP over some other 
practice, such as a Hindu practice (except, perhaps, in cases of radi­
cal conversion). Rather, one grows into the use of CP. So the arbi­
trariness is not one of choice but one that presses the question, 
what justifies my practicing CP rather than some other noninferen­
tial mediated practice? To avoid this arbitrariness, Christian* be­
liefs need justification. CP's noninferential mediated nature makes 
it epistemically inferior to PP. 
We can see the same point if we return to the background belief 
challenge. Compare the Tom and Tim Tibbetts case to the case of 
God. The reason one knows that it is Tim rather than Tom one 
4· There is, in other words, a lingo-conceptual link between religious experi­
ence and the beliefs religious practice generates. I am not convinced that this is best 
construed theistically; it may be even vaguer than that. 
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sees in the next yard is not given by the phenomena but requires 
that one have the belief that Tom is out of town. This background 
belief to which one appeals is of a fairly high level in terms of its 
content vis-a-vis Tom and Tim. Furthermore, although we do 
come to recognize human persons by their features, actions, and 
personality, as Alston says, we do so only on being introduced to 
them and learning their individual names. Our background beliefs 
about the persons we know seem to be fully personal in their con­
tent. I remember (or at least it is within the range of my memory) 
that Jack appears the way this phenomenal experience I am now 
having appears. Thus, my noninferential mediated generation of 
the belief "This is Jack," is justified. It will not do, as Alston sug­
gests, simply for it to be true that such and such an appearance is 
sufficient for the appearance to be "ofJack" in the circumstances in 
which I find myself. 5 The circumstances are too important to be 
passed over so lightly, for it is these circumstances that contain the 
information enabling me to objectify this experience as an experi­
ence of Jack. Since the circumstances cannot be confined to spa­
tiotemporal information picked up in the experience, this informa­
tion must be brought to the experience, presumably as beliefs. The 
background beliefs needed for identifying individual persons seem 
always to have a content that contains reference to that unique per­
son and thus, to avoid arbitrary application of proper names to 
phenomenal experiences that do not "contain" the proper-name in­
formation, the background beliefs need justification. 
Why should it be any different with God and experiences of 
him? In Alston's case, if one does need background beliefs, these 
cannot be without (theistic) Christian content. If they were with­
out such content, and given the constraint that no experience can 
be phenomenologically of the Christian God, then how could they 
give rise to the generation of a Christian belief, at least one with 
content that is specifically about the unique individual, God the 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ? Assuming that they do need to 
have Christian content, then the beliefs need either inferential or 
noninferential justification. If, on the one hand, they are justified 
5· Alston has suggested to me that I am not willing to be externalist enough 
about the circumstances. Here, I guess, is the proverbial parting of the ways, since 
I think he is all too willing to be externalist where he ought not to be. 
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via inference, Alston's position succumbs to the evidentialist, just 
as Plantinga's does. On the other hand, if they are justified nonin­
ferentially, we are back into the same kind of infinite regress laid at 
Plantinga's feet. There must be, somewhere, a nonexperiential jus­
tification of theistic Christian beliefs. 6 
Here perhaps Alston can suggest that one need only be justified 
in the background beliefs (and not need to justify them) and the 
regress does not get started. But the need for being justified is all 
my argument rests on. Unlike Alston's appeal to similar strategies 
in other contexts-for example, where one may be justified in a 
certain epistemic principle and that enables one to be justified in 
another belief-there is no distinction in epistemic level between 
the belief in question and the theistic background belief. The latter 
does not function at a different level epistemically; it is a first-order 
belief and not a second-order principle. Alston may appeal to his 
externalist account of justification for these background beliefs, but 
one still can raise the infinite regress problem as long as the exter­
nalist account is rooted in experience. How are these justified (as 
opposed to justifiable)? My suggestion is that they too must appeal 
to background beliefs that in turn appeal to background beliefs, 
and the regress is off and running. 
Thus Alston's parity thesis appears to be in little better shape 
than Plantinga's. The deliverances of PP are conceptual-reading be­
liefs whereas those of CP are noninferential mediated beliefs. The 
latter are such that the background beliefs needed for their justifica­
tion stand in need of justification themselves. As such, they cannot 
have the same strength of justification as conceptual-reading be­
liefs. I have more to say about CP in Chapters 10 and 11, but I 
believe the argument here shows that the observation about back­
ground beliefs made in Chapters 2 and 3 is epistemically impor­
tant. Conceptual-reading beliefs differ from noninferential medi­
ated beliefs in that the latter have an additional step needed for 
their epistemic justification. The evidentialist specter is present in 
Alston's epistemology of religion as well as Plantinga's. 
6. We need to consider the theistic, nonlawlike kind of externalism mentioned 
in Chapter 7, Section 6, as a possibility. Alternatively, could we not be introduced 
to God much as we are introduced to a new human being? Is this nonexperiential? 
What about the credulity disposition? I consider these issues in Chapter 1 I. 
II 
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2. Alston's Rejection of the Parity Thesis: Checking 
Procedures 
In Perceiving God, Alston moves away from the parity thesis. He 
does so for two reasons. The second bears the burden of my con­
cern in the next section, but the first deserves to be recognized as 
well. 
In his chapter on the Christian mystical perceptual practice 
(CMP), Alston contends that CMP satisfies the conditions for ra­
tional acceptance. As with sense practice (SP) (what I have called 
PP), CMP is acquired and engaged in long before one is explicitly 
aware of the practice, it involves procedures for evaluating its out­
puts, it is set in a broader context of epistemic practices that in­
volve interacting with perceived objects, it is socially transmitted 
and monitored, it depends on and is connected with other prac­
tices, it is subject to change, and it has its own set of distinctive 
presuppositions. There are differences, of course. CMP has a dis­
tinctive conceptual scheme, a distinctive subject matter, and its 
own overrider system of beliefs. Alston also gives an account of 
how CMP is to be distinguished from other epistemic practices, 
including other religious epistemic practices. 
In defense of CMP's being rationally engaged in, Alston sug­
gests that he has already made a prima facie case for its being so, 
since it is a socially established doxastic practice. But he does con­
sider at length reasons for denying that it is a genuine, full-fledged 
practice. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the charges 
that CMP is only partially distributed among the population, that 
CMP is not a widely shared practice, and that it is not a source of 
new information. The important issue for us is the supposed lack 
of checks and tests of particular perceptual beliefs. Alston fills sev­
eral pages dealing with this charge and, although he admits that 
CMP does lack the kind of checking system SP has, this does not 
show that CMP is unreliable. All that need concern us here is what 
Alston says toward the end of his discussion of the overrider sys­
tem. 
I am quite prepared to recognize that a checking system of the sort 
we have in SP is an epistemic desideratum. If we were shaping the 
world to our heart's desire, I dare say we would arrange for all our 
fallible doxastic practices to include such checks. It certainly puts us 
Background Beliefs and Religious Plurality 
in a better position to distinguish between correct and incorrect per­
ceptual beliefs than what we have in CMP. But though this shows 
that CMP is epistemically inferior to SP in this respect, that is not 
the same as showing that CMP is unreliable or not rationally en­
gaged in, or that its outputs are not prima facie justified. 7 
( I 6 3 
Here Alston links explicitly what he earlier referred to as "cog­
nitively desirable features" to epistemic concerns. An epistemic 
practice's failing to have certain cognitively desirable features that 
another has does indeed indicate a difference in epistemic level. So 
if SP is epistemically superior to CMP because of the kind of 
checking procedures available to it, even though the latter is still 
rationally acceptable, one suspects that a strict parity thesis be­
tween SP and CMP is not forthcoming. Still, both are prima facie 
rationally engaged in, on Alston's account, and that is all he sets 
out to show in Perceiving God. 
3. Alston's Rejection of the Parity Thesis: Religious 
Plurality 
The problem of religious diversity for the rationality of engaging 
in CMP, says Alston, cannot be handled in the same way as others 
he discusses, that is, by calling attention to "epistemic imperialism" 
or the "double standard." The intuition behind the problem with 
plurality is that "if the general enterprise of forming perceptual re­
ligious beliefs is carried on in different religions in such a way as to 
yield incompatible results, no such practice can be considered to be 
reliable, so none is rationally engaged in. "8 But Alston uses consid­
erable space spelling out exactly what the issue is. There are two 
questions. In what way are religious practices incompatible, and 
why or how does this incompatibility cast doubt on CMP's ratio­
nality? I take these in order. 
The incompatibility, says Alston, is not an internal one because 
there is more than one practice for forming perceptual religious 
beliefs. Any incompatibility is an interpractice problem, not an in­
trapractice problem. Thus, if there is incompatibility it is between 
the deliverances of two separate practices. If one takes it that these 
7. Alston, Perceiving God, p. 220. 
8. Ibid., p. 255. 
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deliverances are of the singular subject-predicate form and that 
they attribute to the subject some putatively perceivable attribute 
or activity, then there are two questions to ask. First, is the subject 
the same? Second, are the predicates incompatible? 
Again, we can take these in order. Although there are' cases in 
which the subjects of the beliefs delivered by various religious epi­
stemic practices are (taken to be) the same (such as in Christianity, 
Judaism, and Islam), this is not always the case. The beliefs the 
Christian has about God are quite different than those held by the 
Hindu, and although different beliefs about an object do not entail 
that the objects are truly different, there seems to be good reason 
to think they are. So in these cases, even if the predicates attribut­
able to perceived religious objects are incompatible, that does not 
show that the beliefs are incompatible unless it can be shown that 
the objects are the same. 
On the predicate side, much of the apparent contradiction is not 
due to the positive content of the beliefs but rather to what Alston 
calls "implicit denials." Attributing to God the message that Jesus 
is his Son is not incompatible with Mohammed being God's 
prophet unless the former message also contains a rider claiming 
that Jesus' work is the only way to salvation. Even Thomas Aqui­
nas thought that mystical claims of God's being an undifferentiated 
unity (such as we find in Vedanta or Yoga mystical literature) are 
not incompatible with claims that God is personal. There must be a 
denial of the identity between God-as-undifferentiated-unity and 
God-as-personal assumed by the one who holds the former. At the 
very least, says Alston, caution is called for here. Seeming contra­
dictions are not always what they appear. 
To identify contradictions, Alston raises the issue of how doxas­
tic practices in other religions are to be separated from CMP. Most 
of his discussion in Perceiving God is cast in terms of "God." But 
nontheistic religions do not, obviously, describe the object of their 
epistemic experiences in that language. So Alston broadens his 
conception of religious (what he calls "mystical") practice by stat­
ing that "it is what is taken by the subject to be a direct experiential 
awareness of the Ultimate," where by Ultimate he means "the ulti­
mate determiner of one's existence, condition, salvation, destiny, 
or whatever. "9 This broader conception of religious practice pro-
9. Ibid., p. 258. 
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vides the basis for showing the incompatibility of the output of the 
competing practices. It is helpful to quote Alston here at some 
length: 
One's conception of the Ultimate will differ in different religions. 
Even where the broad outlines of the conception is the same, as it is 
among the various theistic religions, the details will differ. After all, 
a religiously very important feature of the Christian, Jewish, and 
Moslem conceptions of the Ultimate has to do with God's purposes 
for mankind and His work in history; and the account of this varies 
drastically from one of these traditions to another. And all these will 
diverge sharply from the conception of the Ultimate in Buddhism 
and certain forms of Hinduism, where the Ultimate is not thought 
of as a personal agent. Let's further note that one's conception of 
God (the Ultimate) enters, to a greater or lesser degree, into a par­
ticular subject's identification of the perceived object as God (Brah­
man ... ). When I take God to be present to me I will, if I am a 
Christian, but not if I am Moslem or a Hindu, most likely take it 
that He who became man in the person of jesus Christ to save us .from our 
sins is present to me. Indeed, it is generally true that we make use of 
what we believe about perceived objects when we perceptually iden­
tify them. When I take the person I see across the room to be Joe 
Walker, I thereby take him to be the person with whom I went to 
college, who lives two blocks from me, and so on. Because of this 
leakage of the background belief system into perceptual beliefs, the 
latter will be incompatible with each other across religious tradi­
tions, even if the predicates attributed in these perceptual beliefs are as 
compatible with each other as you like. 10 
The upshot of his discussion is that, even if the perceptual beliefs 
we have about God do not conflict themselves, the practices of 
forming such beliefs are still subject to serious conflict by virtue of 
the associated belief systems. 
After considering two ways one might strive to show that the 
associated belief systems are not incompatible (one is by trimming 
the exclusivistic claims from the various religions and the other is 
Hick's Kantian strategy), Alston says that most practitioners of re­
ligion are pre-Kantian in their beliefs, that is, they are realists about 
them. So, in fact, from the point of view of the actual practice of 
believers, the various religions are incompatible in just the way 
Alston suggests. 
IO. Ibid., pp. 258-59· 
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A second important question Alston discusses is why or how 
religious plurality influences the rationality of engaging in CMP. 
He considers two versions of an argument in which it is suggested 
that religiously diverse results of mystical practices lead �o the dis­
crediting of CMP. The stronger version is developed from "a natu­
ralist line." It suggests that the best explanation for the radical in­
commensurability of mystical practice output is that each result is 
nothing more than an internally generated practice, with no refer­
ent beyond the practitioners. But, says Alston, there is no reason 
to assume that this is the best explanation. There could very well 
be aspects of reality so difficult for us to discern that we end up 
with quite different results when we try to discern them. A more 
modest version of the charge against the rationality of engaging in 
any religious epistemic practice, and hence the practice of CMP, is 
"to suggest that the diversity is best explained by supposing that 
none of the competing practices is a reliable way of determining 
what that reality is like. "11 The argument behind this suggestion is 
that if one of the practices were reliable it would show itself to be. 
But why, says Alston, should we assume that? 
There is another possibility, however. Given the rich diversity 
among religious doxastic practices, only one, if any, of the prac­
tices can be reliable. Why suppose it is CMP? There are many rea­
sons internal to CMP, but do we not need reasons external to the 
practice, since all the practices presumably have internal reasons? 
The critic will suggest that no such external reasons are forthcom­
ing, so there is no reason to engage in CMP or, for that matter, in 
any other religious doxastic practice. Alston responds that perhaps 
there are external reasons, but he passes over them and takes the 
worst-case scenario by assuming that there is no external evidence. 
He concludes that the justificatory efficacy of CMP is not dissipated 
but may be significantly weakened by the fact of religious diversity. 
It is not dissipated because there is a significant difference be­
tween cases of religious diversity and nonreligious diversity. Con­
sider the different observation reports of an accident or competing 
means of predicting the weather. In both kinds of case there are 
accepted means by which to resolve the dispute, even when one 
cannot in fact use those means. Hence, when the reports or 
I I. Ibid.' p. 268. 
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methods appear to conflict, there is at least the possibility of reso­
lution. It is this very possibility of resolution that dissipates the 
rationality of engaging in all these diverse means of predicting the 
weather or trusting everyone's report about an accident. But with 
the case of religious diversity there is no possible means of resolu­
tion. So why then take the absence of such means to count against 
the reliability of the practice? Alston suggests that there is no good 
reason to do so and hence that religious diversity does not dissipate 
the rationality of engaging in CMP. 
It does reduce the strength of the justification, however. The 
basic reason is that, although it is possible to imagine ways we 
might differ in our viewing the world with competing SPs (say, by 
a "Cartesian" practice of seeing what is visually perceived as an 
indefinitely extended medium that is more or less concentrated at 
various points or a "Whiteheadian" practice of seeing the world as 
a series of momentary events growing out of one another vs. our 
"Aristotelian" practice of seeing the world as made up of more or 
less discrete objects scattered through space), such a possibility is 
just a possibility. With mystical practice, the possibility is actu­
alized. The various practitioners of mystical practices do indeed 
view ultimate reality differently. If this problem did not exist, pre­
sumably CMP would be taken to be more strongly trustworthy. 
Engaging in CMP remains prima facie rational, even if one cannot 
see how to solve the problem of religious diversity. But the 
strength of its overall rational status is less than that of other prac­
tices, such as SP, where there is no problem of diversity, as a mat­
ter of fact. And so Alston does not see himself as committed to 
parity between CMP and SP (CP and PP). 
If Alston is correct about this last point, then CP and PP do not 
share the same strength (or level) of epistemic status, although they 
are both prima facie rational. But in addition to the reason put 
forth in his discussion of religious diversity, there is Alston's point 
about checking procedures and epistemic desiderata, as well as the 
position argued throughout this book that there is a distinction be­
tween conceptual-reading and noninferential mediated practices, 
with CP being the latter and PP and unique physical object practice 
the former. So there is a triple reason to reject PTX as anything 
close to a complete description of the relationship between the ra­
tional status of CP and PP. 
I 6 8 ) Rationality and Theistic Belief 
I have argued that PT� fails as a complete account because en­
gaging in CP does not have the same strength of overall rationality 
as engaging in PP, even though it remains prima facie rational to 
engage in both. What remains to be done is to consider some of 
Plantinga's suggestions about epistemic warrant as those 
'sugges­
tions apply to the parity thesis, as well as to defend Plantinga's 
suggestion that beliefs about God can be properly basic against a 
challenge resting on confirmation. The discussion of confirmation 
serves as a springboard to the final goal of this book, which is to 
suggest and defend a new parity thesis. 
